Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to provide a perspective and framework for the development of safeguarding and monitoring procedures for the various stages of disposition of excess military plutonium. The paper briefly outlines and comments on m e of the issues involved in safeguarding and monitoring excess military plutonium as it pgresses h m weapons through dismantlement, to fabrication as reacto~ fuel, to use in a m m r , and finally to storage and disposal as spent fueL ''Military" refers to ownership, and includes both reactor-grade and-weapon-grade plutgnium. "Excess" refers to plutonium (in any form) that a government decides is no'Ionger needed for military use and can be irrevocably removed from military stockpiies. Many of the issues and proposals presentedin this paper are basedon, or are similar to, thase mentioned in theNational Academy of Sciences WAS) report'on excess military Safeguards for plutonium disposition are discussed elsewhere2 in tern of reQuirements established by the US. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and thehtemational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
fire, the discussion is less specific. The term "safeguarding" is used broadly to refu to materialS confml and aammtancy (MC&A), containment and Suryeiuance (C&S),' and physical protection of nuclear materials by the state that possesses those materials. This is also referred to as material protection, control, and accountancy (MPCA). The term "safeguarding" Was chosen for brevity and to distinguish MecA considered in this paper from international or IAEA safeguards. "Monitoring" is used to refer to activities designed to assure another party (state or international organization) that the nuclear materials of the host state (the United States or Russia) are secure and not subject to Much of what is said in this paper applies not only to mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel but to any plutonium reactor fuel, and even to plutonium being disposed of directly. This paper deals with institutional issues associated with military plutonium as opposed to civilian plutonium, but some comments apply to both civilian and military plutonium.
. Arms Control, Nonproliferation, And Security Of Nuclear MateriaIs
In deahg with military plutonium in the United States and the Russian Federation, there is a persistent tendency to mix, and often confuse, what can be called traditional arms control with nonproliferation and w i t h the security (against theft) of nuclear materials. Recently, traditional arms control has been conwmed with START I & II. Nonproliferation has been primarily concerned with measures aimed at preventing or discouraging a state from acquiring nuclear weapons. Historically, IAEA.activities have focused on detecting the diversion of nuclear materials from nuclear power programs (in states other than the five declared nuclear weapons states). Currently, however, overt or covert theft, and trade, of nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union &pars to be emerging as the new and pressing international concern.
ARMS CONTROL
Literally, and broadly, "aqns control" xefm to any activity whose aim is to control arms. For in a higher preinitiation probability, which leads to an unCertainty h yield. However, a significant "fizzle" yield is always p0~sible.l~ Depending on the intended use, this yield uncertainty may or may not present a problem.
The design of a weapon is further complicated by the heat output of RPu. In particular, in a system insulated with high explosive, a rise in tempemme could cause swelling due to a phase change in the plutonium, Tbis change in geometry could render the weapon less effective or unusable. However, it is well known that the phase (and hence the density) of plutonium can be stabilized by adding small amounts (about 1%) of gallium. There ate also potential probIems with the high expIosive. 'Ihe heat a u l d melt or even ignite it. Various experts bave advanced ideas for dealing with the hear., but these furrher cumplicate the design. The heat generated by RPu is 10 to 15 Wkg, as against about 2.4 w k g for W P U .~~ his diffeaence might notprecIude the desigp ofa workable weapon using RPu, but it is adisiricehtivei considered. 'Ihe neutron exposure would scale with the greatet number of neutrons in RPu--about a factor of three more, depending on the amount of Pu-2clo. Depending on the geometxy. the gamma dose would be increased by about an order of magnitude. Radiation exposure CouId be reduced to manageable levels by shielding, so that radiation would complicate, but not preclude, the fabrication of a weapon from RPu.
As with fabrication, the= could be ~011-about exposure of (military) personnel handling weapons made from RPu. The gamma radiation is primariy due to the 6o.keV photons from Am-aI. In a'weapon (a metal sphere), most of tfiese photons would be shielded by the plutonium itself. In addition to this self-shieIding, the radiation emanating from the plutonium surface would be shielded by any additional layer of heavy material, such as a t a m p or case. . .
L
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STAGES
The first line in Fig. 1 , labeled "Stage," refers to the sequence of states and processes through which the plutonium passes as it progresses from the stockpile to the repository. This figure does not show the plutonium in bulk, metal, scrap, waste, etc. This is a real complication, because some of these materials must be carefully protected, and some may be more of an environmental hazard than a security concern. Some of these forms might be fabricated into MOX; others might be disposed of directly. 
weapons-usablefissilematerials.
Obtaining s e -plutoniupl or h s h MOX fuel is distinctly different from possessing a nuclear weapon or component I t is by no means a foregone conclusion 1 that a terrorist group could successfully process and fabricate plutonium or fuel into a workable nuclear explosive; but they might do so, and we must therefm protect against that risk Extension of a stored weapons standard to all separated plutonium and HEU and fresh plutonium or HEU fuel would strengthen international confidence in the security of nuclearmaterials.
spent fuel around the world, nevertheless felt that it was useful to use the term "spent fuel standard" in discussing disposition criteria. 'ibis "standard" does not necessarily imply that the spent fuel is self-protecting, nor that it is suitable for disposal in a geologic repository. Using the tenn "spent fuel standard" recognizes that there are several hundred tonnes of plutonium in spent fuel around the worldz and that i t is not worthwhile to take exceptional measures to make spent fuel from the 200 or so tonnes of WPu less available or less attractive for weapons than RPu from civilian spent fuel.
The NAS Committee, realizing that the= is a wide variation in the nawe and age of Similarly, plutonium that is immobilized and d i s p o s e d of directly should ty no more available or attractive for weapons than F W u in spent fueL This last issue, which is not of direct relevance for this paper, is more problematic. Fit, a spent fuel standard is not precisely defined, and second, a security equivalence relation would have to be developed taking into aCCOunt the characteristics (size, weight, composition, etc.) of the plutonium-bearing objects (e.g., glass logs). This equivalence relation could vary depending on the threat scenarios considered.
Although much less attractive than weapons, components, or separated ma&, spent fuel is a potential source of plutonium or HEU. The principal factor inhibiting the separation of plutonium from spent fuel is the mdioactivity. It is genemlly believed that madmed spent fuel is so radioactive (self-protecting) that it can be moved and processed only with specialized equipment and facilities. However, it is conceivable that a smalI, possibly subnational, p u p acting in secret with no concern for the environment (other than for the reduction of tell-tale signatures) and WiIling to incur substantial but not lefhal radiation doses, could obtain plutonium by stealing and processing irradiated spent fuel that had cooled for 15 to 20 yearsJ6 It should be noted that spent fuel from research or naval reactors containing HEu might be a more attractive target than spent fuel containing plutonium. As with fabricating a weapon, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that a terrorist group could successfuUy steal and process spent fuel to obtain plutoninm: but they might so do, and we must thefore also protect against this risk Appropriate levels of protection could be defined, given the physical chatacteaitics of the spent fuel (makeup, eqxsure history, age, size, weight, fissiie matetial content, etc.). ' According to the U.S. Nuclear &&latory Commission (and the IAEA), spent fuel can be considered to be "selfprotecting" ifthe uashie~ckddo~erate m air one miter Erom a spent fuel assembly is 100 mdhr (1 G y k ) or mm. The NAS report suggests ' that this "standard" should be reekmined Specification of this standard requires mcKe detail, such as the orientation of pe fuel assembly. The adequacy of this standard depends on a number of factors. Of course, on-site physical protection measures, including guards, fences, and alarms, are a principal line of defense and deterrent ?he mofe robust the physical protection measures, the less reliance need be placed on the spent-fuel radiation barrier and, conversely, the greater the radiation M e r the less reliance need be placed on the physical protectjon mm*um. Unfortuuately, the physical proteaion measures must be based on the least radioactive fueL The precise relation between radiation and physical protection banien must be detemmd * inthecontextof credible threats or Scenarios. One hundred radhr is not adequate in alI-cases.
The adequacy of local and regional law enforcement becomes a key issue when there is no radation barrier (as in the case of separated materials or fresh fuel), when the radiation barrier is inadequate (as in the case of 15-to 2O-year-old fuel), and if the physical protection measures are overcome. The existence and ability of police or military forces to prevent the theft of plutonium or HEU or to recover spent fuel before the plutonium could be separated may be a key consideration in demminin g ths level of physical protection required. Assessing the adequacy of law enforcement may be problematic. One can count the number of officers or troops and vehicles and take their . .
-loation into account, but a more operational assessment would also be desirable. Because banks everywhexe protect a universally common asset (money or gold), one possibility might be to look at the relative risk at various localities as reflected by bank insurance premiunis. me analogy is by no means perfect, but it might help in evaluating the differences in safeguarding measures appropriate in Russia, Europe, Japan, and the United States.
MONITORING REGIMES
It is unlikely that nuclear weapons w i l l be monitored soon, other than by the states that possess them (with the possible exception of states of the fonner Soviet Union A number of declarations have already been made. The United States has shut down its plutonium production reactors and has declared its intention not to produce any more fissile material for weapons; Russia has declared its intention to' stop productim by the year 2000?* On June 23,1994 the US. and Russian governments ( i i the persons of Gore and Chernomydin) signed an agreement embracing these intentions and going includes monitoring or verification2 ! In addition to being the basis for monitoring the beyond them to state that henceforth plutonium from production reactors would not be used for weapons and that the United S t a k and Russia would seek alternative sources of electricity and heat so that the Russian reactors could be shut down as soon as practicable. The United States has also declared the total amount of plutonium produced (102 tonnes, including 13 tonnes of RPu)F9
The United States and Russia may soon d e c k initial amounts of excess plutonium and HEU. (Russia has in fact declared 500 tonnes of HEU to be excess by agrkeing to sell that much for incorporation into LEU fuel.) In order to facilitate monitoring, the amounts of excess materials fabricated into fuel, utilized in reactors, and finally either recycled or disposed of should also be specified. As plans and agreements for the ' number of nuclear weapons in future stockpiles are reached (e.g., START I l ) , the approximate total amounts of excess mateaials could be declared. At the Clinton-Yeltsin summit in Washington in September 1994, it was agreed that the United States and the Russian Fedemion would exchange information on nuclear weapons and materials?o Although these deckations are to be confidential, they could set apreqdent and could form the basis for & d o n s by the five nuclear weapons states and eventually by all states.
To establish confidence around the worId and to support the type of declaratoq regime called for in the NAS report, declarations would have to be followed by monitoring, possibly by bilatesal monitoring at first. In the plutonium disposition progmms, the United States and Russiahave the opporamity to develop the groundwork (standads, precedents, e@.) for an expanding nuclear materials regime. As stoclrpiles of weapons and matetials are reduced, the tfiree other decl;ned nuclear weapons states could be invited (or perhaps induced by world opinion) to participate. The ulpurpose would be to create a worldwide @me thai was focused on the accounting and proteaion of all weapons-capable mateFials. 
summary
The disposition of excess military plutonium focuses attention on safeguarding and monitoring and introduces anumber of new issues.Thesehavebeen discussed anda number of observations and proposals have been put farward. These include:
It follows from NAS objeuives for the management and dk&sition of excess materials that security, mther than economics g energy considerations. will be the primary criterion in choosing options and technologies. The objectives of arms control, nonpdiferation, and security of nuclear materials are not identical, and they should not be confused when developing safeguarding andmonitoring measures.
Objectives for safeguarding and monitoring should be clear and should include the following: 1. The prevention of theft and unauthorized use.
2.
The demonstration that the control, accounting, and security for separated excess plutonium are comparable to those for nuclear weapons. 3. The detection of any reuse for weapons by the host country.
